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We characterize environmental quality as a stock, and its rate of deterioration as a flow. 
We consider a class of problems, which we call “SFQ” problems, in which both stocks and flows 
can be controlled to promote the quality of a resource stock. Abatement (curbing the flow) and 
restoration (restoring the stock) are interdependent tools in such problems. Under the optimal 
policy, periodic restoration complements positive but variable abatement that partly stems the 
quality decline. The preferred balance between the two strategies depends on environmental and 
economic factors. If flows are low enough, or if abatement is sufficiently inexpensive relative to 
restoration, optimal abatement may be sufficiently intense to offset the expected deterioration 
and produce an equilibrium in expectation. When deterioration is more rapid or more variable, 
when abatement is more expensive, or when restoration is less costly, the optimal policy relies 
more on restoration.  
 
We apply the analysis to the restoration of an endangered species, and show how it could 
illuminate a range of other problems in the environmental arena. But the lessons are general, and 
we briefly discuss how they apply to the management of both physical and human capital stocks. 
 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper considers the optimal management of a valued resource in a dynamic setting. We
meld two traditional approaches to promoting quality. The ﬁrst entails restoring the quality of the
resource. The second involves curbing its deterioration.
Though our focus is on the control of environmental quality, a public policy problem, an example
from the private sector illustrates our theory. Consider the simple problem of automobile ownership.
The rate at which a car deteriorates — and hence how soon it must be replaced — can be slowed
by regular maintenance. Eventually, an automobile wears out and is replaced with another: in
our terms, the quality of the valued resource (transportation services) is restored. Over the life
of the car, optimal maintenance varies. Early on, it increases with time: the car is still valuable
but requires increasing attention. Toward the end of the car’s life, however, optimal maintenance
declines, since the future beneﬁts of maintenance diminish. A driver about to junk her car is
unlikely to get an oil change.
The motivating observation of this paper is that the simple logic of automobile care applies to the
management of a wide range of resource stocks in the environmental arena. The accumulation and
treatment of waste at landﬁlls or generating sites is a canonical example. Optimal management
both slows the generation of new wastes and periodically cleans up accumulated stocks. The
management of groundwater aquifers oﬀers another instance: an aquifer can be recharged when
depleted, while conservation measures can slow the rate at which it gets drawn down. Populations
of endangered species such as the California condor can be replenished through captive breeding
programs; the population’s rate of decline can be slowed by eﬀorts aimed to reduce mortality risks
or habitat loss. For the degraded natural habitat in the Florida Everglades, restoration would
involve a large-scale project to reroute water ﬂows and reintroduce native species, while reducing
pollution would slow the rate at which degradation continues.
In each of these settings, two distinct approaches are available to manage the quality of the
resource: boosting the resource stock and slowing the rate at which the stock deteriorates. Hence
both stocks and ﬂows can be controlled to promote quality. We refer to this class of problems as
“SFQ” problems. In this paper, we develop a general model of the optimal management of a resource
stock when ﬂows are controllable and restoration of the stock is feasible. To distinguish formally
between the two strategies, we assume that the costs of ﬂow control (which we call abatement)
increase on the margin, but that stock control (or restoration) exhibits economies of scale, so that
1discrete cleanup eﬀorts are potentially desirable. Such scale economies are likely to obtain in many
settings. For example, one way to clean up a hazardous waste site is to haul the soil away and
incinerate it, in which case the costs vary little with the initial concentration of the contaminant in
the soil. Similarly, there are high ﬁxed costs involved in capping a landﬁll or restoring an endangered
species. What is crucial to our analysis is that there are economies of scale “at the bottom” — that
is, that the average costs of cleanup do not increase too much as the quality of the stock diminishes.
In terms of the car-care example above, we assume that maintenance (abatement) exhibits convex
costs, but that the cost of replacement is driven primarily by the quality of the new car, not of the
old.
Under the optimal policy, the manager restores the resource whenever environmental quality
falls far enough. At states above the restoration point, the manager abates the new ﬂow, at
a speciﬁed rate that varies with the current quality of the resource. After restoration occurs,
environmental degradation resumes, environmental quality starts to decline (albeit stochastically),
and the cycle repeats. The optimal trade-oﬀ between abatement and restoration depends on a range
of environmental and economic factors. If ﬂows are low enough, or if abatement is suﬃciently
inexpensive relative to restoration, optimal abatement may be suﬃciently intense to oﬀset the
expected deterioration and produce an equilibrium in expectation. Even in this case, restoration
remains an option if unexpected shocks reduce the stock of quality suﬃciently, and its availability
inﬂuences the optimal abatement path. When deterioration is more rapid or more variable, when
abatement is more expensive, or when restoration is less costly, the optimal policy relies more on
restoration.
The model of this paper melds two instruments that have typically been considered in isolation.
Conventional models of the optimal management of stock pollutants have modeled abatement
alone.1 The optimal policy in that setting equates the marginal beneﬁt of reducing pollution,
adjusted for the discount rate and the decay rate of the stock, to the marginal cost of abating it. A
steady state is reached in which optimal abatement eﬀorts just keep up with net new accumulation
(Falk and Mendelsohn 1993; Keeler, Spence, and Zeckhauser 1971; Plourde 1972; Plourde and
Yeung 1989; Smith 1972).2 The possibility of restoration signiﬁcantly aﬀects the management of
1In our model, of course, the “stock” is a good (resource quality) rather than a bad (pollution); but that is only
ad i ﬀerence in sign. The important distinction is that we consider controls on both stocks and ﬂows.
2A few models of optimal cleanup of an accumulated stock of pollution have considered restoration but not
abatement. Caputo and Wilen (1995) assume that cleanup costs are convex. As a result, the optimal solution stops
short of complete cleanup (they let natural degradation ﬁnish the process), as long as when pollution approaches zero
so does its marginal damage. Phillips and Zeckhauser (1998) assume economies of scale in cleanup, but consider the
2the resource. When restoration oﬀering economies of scale is available, optimal cleanup may proceed
in a jerky fashion. Rather than reaching a steady-state and remaining there, the optimal policy may
entail periodic restorations punctuating long periods of abatement. Moreover, the availability of
restoration reduces the optimal abatement rate, with the reduction greatest as restoration becomes
imminent.
In the same way, endogenous maintenance has signiﬁcant consequences for optimal replacement
of physical capital. In the theoretical literature on capital investment, attention has mostly centered
on replacement rather than maintenance — that is, on restoration rather than abatement.3 Optimal
investment in these models typically follows an (S,s) policy (Arrow, Harris, and Marschak 1951).
We show how introducing abatement changes the “trigger level” at which restoration is optimal.
The next section introduces the basic model, and formally deﬁnes our notions of abatement
and restoration. Section 3 develops the theoretical results. Section 4 illustrates these results with
examples of real-world SFQ problems in the environmental arena, and includes an application of
the model to the recovery of the California condor. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model framework
Our model considers an environmental resource with a quality level that changes over time. In the
case of accumulating waste, for example, the quality might be measured by the volume of waste:
the smaller the amount, the higher the level of environmental quality.4 In the case of an endangered
species, quality would correspond to the size of the species population. We represent the quality
of the environmental resource at time t by a real number xt. Larger values of xt represent more
desirable states. We normalize the initial quality level to be equal to zero, so that x0 =0 ,a n dw e
shall be working mostly with negative values for x.5
To keep things simple, we assume that there is a “manager” of the resource, who implements
abatement and restoration policies in order to maximize the expected net present value of welfare
to society as a whole. We recognize that most environmental problems do not involve a single
problem in a static setting and hence ignore abatement.
3For models of investment in physical capital, see Feldstein and Rothschild (1974) and Abel and Eberly (1994,
1996). Nickell (1975) considers maintenance as well as replacement, but he models maintenance as exogenously
determined. For a model of optimal consumption of durable goods, see Grossman and Laroque (1990).
4Note that we use “quality” to denote the state of the resource: for example, it may measure how much pollution
has accumulated. How the quality of a resource is valued will be captured in the utility function.
5The normalization of the starting point to zero simpliﬁes notation. A reader uncomfortable with negative values
for “quality” may shift the x-axis by any constant amount.
3centralized decision maker. Indeed, the manager could be the administrator of a regulatory agency
that issues rules or provides rewards to inﬂuence the behavior of private-sector ﬁrms. The interactive
aspects of this problem are beyond the present analysis. We focus instead on the behavior that a
central planner would prescribe, recognizing full well that in many situations it would be carried
out on a decentralized basis.
In addition to any eﬀorts of the resource manager, two processes acting in opposite directions
aﬀect the level of environmental quality: ongoing damage to the resource and natural recovery
processes, such as the decay of the accumulated pollutants. To capture both eﬀects, we model the
deterioration of the resource as a random variable with drift.6 In particular, cumulative deteriora-
tion up to time t, denoted by zt, is assumed to follow a Brownian motion with drift rate µ>0,
variance rate σ2,a n dz0 = 0. Hence, deterioration evolves according to zt = µt − σwt,where wt
follows a standard Brownian motion. Unless the manager curbs the rate of deterioration or restores
the resource, therefore, quality at time t is given by
xt = −µt + σwt. (1)
Intuitively, µ can be thought of as the “average” rate of deterioration of the resource: for example,
the average ﬂow of pollution minus the natural decay of existing pollution. The random term in
equation (1) captures random variations in the processes of damage and natural recovery.
2.1 Utility and cost functions
We assume that society’s beneﬁt from the resource at any point in time depends only on the level
of environmental quality. Thus, at time t society derives a ﬂow of utility u(xt) from the availability
of the resource.7 W ea s s u m et h a tt h es o c i a lr a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c ei sα > 0. We further assume
that the utility function has the following properties.
Assumption 1 The utility function u is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, with u<0, u0 > 0,
6Most of the previous literature treats pollution as deterministic. An exception is Plourde and Yeung (1989), who
model pollution accumulation as stochastic and analyze eﬃcient regulatory policies. Their analysis is akin to our
model without restoration (see our Theorem 2, below).
7We ignore issues such as population growth or changes in income, which could make the utility function time-
dependent. With a growing population, for example, one might scale the utility function to the size of the population,
so that the absolute value of the (negative) utility associated with a given level of environmental damage (negative
quality) would increase over time. If abatement costs remained constant, the optimal level of abatement at a given
level of environmental quality would increase over time. On the other hand, we might expect that abatement costs
and the drift rate µ might be greater for a larger population producing more waste.




is ﬁnite for all x,w h e r eEx
denotes the expectation conditional on an initial state x.
Note that utility takes negative values; the utility function can be thought of as the negative of
a convex loss function. The assumption of negative utility is made for notational convenience and
has no bearing on our results.8
We deﬁne abatement as a reduction in the rate of deterioration. Abating at rate a slows the
expected deterioration rate from µ to µ−a. We assume that the resource manager faces the classic
trade-oﬀ between the beneﬁts of higher environmental quality and the costs of achieving it.
Assumption 2 The abatement cost function c :[ 0 ,∞) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable with
c ≥ 0, c(0) = 0,a n dc00 ≥ ² for some ²>0.
In our SFQ framework, abatement corresponds to ﬂow control. In the context of pollution
control, for example, end-of-pipe controls on emissions and changes in the production process that
reduce pollution are both forms of abatement. We assume that a ﬁnite maximum feasible rate of
abatement exists, denoted ¯ a.9 This ceiling may be higher than the mean ﬂow rate µ.H e n c eo u r
model allows the resource manager not only to oﬀset actual ﬂows fully but to reverse the ﬂow to
some extent. In such a case, “abatement” results in a positive rate of change in the quality of the
resource. Crucially, the costs of such cleanup are increasing on the margin.
Restoration corresponds to an improvement in environmental quality — aﬀecting the stock di-
rectly, rather than by slowing deterioration. In particular, from any state xt,w ea s s u m et h a tt h e
manager can restore the resource to the state x =0 . 10 In our analysis, we assume an extreme form
of nonconvexity: a positive ﬁxed cost of restoration to a particular level, with zero marginal cost.
8A reader uncomfortable with negative utility may add any constant term she wishes to make utility positive over
its relevant range, without aﬀecting the results.
9The assumption of a ceiling on abatement is innocuous: the ceiling can always be set high enough that the
probability it binds is vanishingly small. We include it to provide a measure of generality. In some cases of interest,
the manager may have limited abilities to stem or particularly to reverse the ﬂow of deterioration.
The assumption also simpliﬁes the proof that an optimal abatement policy exists. However, for the problem
considered here, an optimal abatement policy can be shown to exist even if we allow abatement to be unbounded. In
the abate-only case, the concavity of the value function and the convexity of the abatement cost function are suﬃcient
to ensure that inﬁnite abatement will never be optimal. In the abate-and-restore case, in which the value function
is convex over part of its range, it is also possible (but more complicated) to show that the second derivative of the
abatement cost function is greater than the second derivative of the value function, at least for suﬃciently high rates
of abatement. This rules out the possibility of inﬁnite abatement being optimal in the abate-and-restore case as well.
10A more general framework would explicitly model the manager’s choice of how much to restore — that is, how
far to clean up the resource. For example, there might be more than one possible restoration method; or the costs
of restoration could rise steeply as some very high level of quality was approached. But in general, such a problem
will yield a single optimal destination, so little is lost by our assumption of one restoration technology. Our choice of
x = 0 as the destination, meanwhile, is merely a normalization and does not aﬀect the results.
5Assumption 3 The cost of restoring quality from any state xt to x =0is independent of xt and
is given by C>0.
Thus the cost of restoration is “destination-driven” in the sense of Phillips and Zeckhauser
(1998): restoration cost depends on the ultimate level of environmental quality, rather than the
initial level (or the amount of cleanup needed). While we assume for simplicity that costs are
destination-driven, the results of the model hold for cost functions exhibiting less extreme economies
of scale, as we discuss below in section 3.4.1.
2.2 Abatement and restoration policies
We shall restrict our attention to optimal stationary policies — policies that depend solely on the
state x. This assumption simpliﬁes the analysis and has little practical impact.11
An abatement policy is a mapping a : < 7→ [0,a] from the set of real numbers (the possible values
of the state x) to the interval [0,¯ a] (the feasible levels of abatement). Thus an abatement policy
speciﬁes the abatement level as a function of the state x.Arestoration policy is characterized by
a measurable closed subset R of <. Under a restoration policy R, restoration occurs whenever the
state xt occupies the set R.
Given a combined abatement—restoration policy (a,R), the state of the resource evolves accord-
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The manager’s objective is to choose a combined abatement—restoration policy that maximizes this
expectation simultaneously for all x.
3 Optimal policies for SFQ problems
In this section we analyze optimal policies for general SFQ problems. We ﬁrst characterize the
optimal restoration and abatement policies and show how the feasibility of one clean-up method
11An alternative approach would make the manager’s problem one of choosing an optimal stochastic process {at}
measurable with respect to the ﬁltration generated by {wt}. However, one can show that such an optimal process
can be produced by letting at = a(xt). Thus our assumption that the manager chooses the best among the set of
stationary policies does not aﬀect the practical implications of the analysis.
6aﬀects the optimal use of the other. We then consider how the optimal policies vary with the
mean ﬂow rate µ, the variability of the ﬂow σ2, the discount rate, and the costs of restoration and
abatement. Finally, we brieﬂy consider two extensions of the basic model to accommodate more
general cost functions and a delay in restoration.
3.1 Optimal restoration and abatement
We use stochastic dynamic programming to characterize the optimal restoration and abatement













where the supremum is taken over pairs of abatement and restoration policies. J(x)r e p r e s e n t st h e
maximal present value of the future stream of net beneﬁts (utility minus cost) under the optimal
policy, starting from state x.
Theorem 1 describes the optimal abatement and restoration policies, and the resulting path of
resource quality. It identiﬁes two key quality levels: x, the restoration trigger; and x†,a ni n ﬂection
point in the value function that coincides with maximum abatement.
Theorem 1 Let Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold. Then there exist states x and x†,w i t hx <x †,
such that the following results hold:
(Qualities of the value function)( i )J<0a n dJ(x)i sﬁnite for every x.( i i ) J(x)=J(0) − C
for all x ≤ x. (iii) J is continuously diﬀerentiable for every x, and is twice continuously






J00(x)+( a − µ)J0(x) − αJ(x)+u(x) − c(a)
!
=0 . (4)
(Shape of the value function)( v )J0(x) > 0f o rx ∈ (x,∞). Moreover, (vi) J00(x) > 0f o rx ∈ (x,x †);
(vii) J00(x†)=0 ;a n d( v i i i )J00(x) < 0f o rx ∈ (x†,∞).
(Optimal policy)( i x )T h e r ei saf u n c t i o na∗ :( x,∞) 7−→ [0,a] such that for every x ∈ (x,∞), a∗(x)
uniquely attains the supremum in equation (4). (x) a∗ is increasing on {x ∈ (x,x †)|a(x) 6= a}
and decreasing on {x ∈ (x†,∞)|a(x) 6= a}. (xi) Letting R∗ =( −∞,x], the pair (a∗,R ∗)i sa n
optimal policy.
7The theorem (and subsequent ones) are proven in Appendix A. Here we discuss the optimal
abatement and restoration policies established by the theorem. Figure 1 illustrates optimal policies
for a particular set of parameters. (The functional forms and parameter values used for all ﬁgures
are provided in Appendix B.) Quality x is plotted on the horizontal axis. The optimal abatement
rate, a∗(x), appears above the axis, with the corresponding values of the value function J below.
Under the optimal policy, the manager restores the resource whenever environmental quality
falls to x. This closely resembles the familiar solution to the classic inventory problem: a proﬁt-
maximizing ﬁrm will follow an (S,s) rule in managing its inventory, drawing its stock of goods
down until some level s is reached and then replenishing the inventory up to the level S (Arrow,
Harris, and Marschak 1951; Scarf 1960). The “inventory” in the restoration case is the level of a
resource’s environmental quality, and a restoration corresponds to a replenishment of inventory.
As environmental quality declines from its high initial level, the optimal rate of abatement ﬁrst
increases, but then falls as quality approaches the “trigger level” x. At a heuristic level, this policy
can be understood as equating marginal beneﬁts and marginal costs at each level of quality x.12
From Theorem 1, the abatement rate must attain the supremum of a function fx(a)=aJ0(x)−c(a)
(the components of equation (4) that are a function of a). The ﬁrst term, aJ0(x), represents the
rate at which the value function increases. This corresponds roughly to the expected beneﬁt from
abating at rate a, taking into account present and future utility.13 The second term, c(a), represents
the cost of abatement a. Hence the optimal policy at each state sets the abatement rate to maximize
the resulting “expected net beneﬁt.”
Given the concave utility function, the marginal beneﬁt from abatement at ﬁrst increases as x
diminishes. Since the marginal cost of abatement depends not on environmental quality, but only
o nt h ea m o u n to ft h eﬂow abated, the optimal rate of abatement rises. At a certain point, however,
the optimal abatement path reverses course, with abatement decreasing as quality continues to
worsen. Abatement reaches its peak at the inﬂection point x† identiﬁed in Theorem 1, the point
where the marginal beneﬁt of abatement is greatest. Above x†, the value function is concave, so
that the marginal beneﬁt of abatement increases as the state worsens. Below x†, however, the value
12This and subsequent heuristic explanations aim to connect our formal results to more familiar results from
economics; as a result, they are less technically rigorous than the theorems themselves.
13Heuristically, for a given marginal change in the state dx, the resulting change in the value function would be
J
0(x)dx.A b a t e m e n ta, carried out over an inﬁnitesimal time period of duration dt, yields a marginal improvement
in the state due to abatement dx = adt.W e c a n t h i n k o f ( adt)J
0(x) as the resulting change in the value function
(over an inﬁnitesimal period of time). Dividing through by dt yields the rate of change in the value function, aJ
0(x).
8function is convex.14 As the trigger point x nears, the marginal beneﬁt of abatement diminishes,
since the quality of the resource will soon be restored.15
Evidently, if the abatement rate rises high enough, it will equal or exceed the average ﬂow rate
µ. Suppose this condition obtains, and let x∗ denote the highest quality level at which a(x∗)=µ.
(See Figure 1.) We call x∗ an expectation equilibrium: since abatement at x∗ equals the expected
ﬂow, the quality level will remain there in expectation.16 Moreover, x∗ is locally stable. Starting
from x∗,a“ h i g h ”ﬂow of damages (at a rate greater than µ) will depress environmental quality
below x∗. In response, abatement will increase, so that a∗(x) >µ . Thus the quality level will
return to the target x∗ in expectation. A “low” ﬂow of damages will raise quality above the target
level, leading to a slackening of abatement eﬀorts and a tendency back toward x∗.
Hence when an expectation equilibrium x∗ exists, it acts as an “attractor” for the quality level,
in the sense that quality will arrive at x∗ and stay there in expectation. Because the optimal
abatement path satisﬁes c0(a(x)) = J0(x)a te v e r ys t a t ex>x , the expectation equilibrium satisﬁes
J0(x∗)=c0(µ): it occurs at the point where the marginal cost of fully abating expected new pollution
(achieving a zero net ﬂow in expectation) just equals the marginal net beneﬁts from doing so. This
result is analogous to the steady-state equilibrium derived in deterministic optimal control models.
Nonetheless, as we show in the next section, restoration remains a remote possibility and hence
aﬀects the optimal abatement path.
Because a declines to zero as the trigger level approaches, there must be a second state x∗∗ <
x† <x ∗ at which optimal abatement again equals the average ﬂow rate. This too is an equilibrium,
but it is unstable: any deviation in ﬂow from µ will tend to push quality either downward toward
x or upward toward x∗.I fﬂows are large enough to push quality below x∗∗, the state will (again
in expectation) decline to the restoration trigger x.
14The convexity of the value function below x
† — despite the concavity of the underlying utility function — is a
consequence of the optimal restoration policy. J is constant below x, since the restoration always returns the state
to x =0a taﬁxed cost. Because J is diﬀerentiable, its slope at x is zero. Above x, J is increasing. In some region
just above x, therefore, J(x) must be convex. The upper bound of this region is the inﬂection point x
†.
15Note that the abatement rate falls to zero at the restoration trigger point x. The marginal beneﬁts of further
abatement at that point are zero, because the state will be restored to x = 0 immediately. The smooth-pasting
condition (Krylov, 1980) requires that as the state approaches the trigger, the marginal beneﬁts from abatement
decline smoothly to zero. Marginal cost must follow suit, implying that abatement must go to zero as well.
This result would change slightly under the more general cost functions considered in section 3.4.1. Given a variable
component of restoration cost γ(x),with γ
0(x) < 0, the smooth-pasting result would still hold; but abatement would
decline smoothly to a > 0s a t i s f y i n gc
0(a)=−γ
0(x).
16We use the term “equilibrium” in the sense of “system stability,” rather than in a strategic or game-theoretic
sense. The “expectation” refers to the frequency distribution of states, rather than the beliefs of economic agents.
93.2 The interdependence of abatement and restoration
While the optimal restoration and abatement policies share features with familiar models, neither
strategy takes the form it would in the absence of the other. The availability of abatement changes
the quality level that triggers restoration of the resource, while the feasibility of restoration reduces
the optimal rate of abatement.
T os e eh o wt h ep o s s i b i l i t yo fa b a t e m e n ta ﬀects optimal restoration, consider the case in which
only restoration is feasible. (This case is formally equivalent to the model above with the abatement
ceiling ¯ a set at zero.) Because the absence of abatement as an option constrains the manager’s
actions, the value function in the restore-only case must be everywhere less than the value function
in the combined abate-and-restore case. In other words, the availability of abatement makes the
resource more valuable, because its deterioration can be slowed. Figure 2 illustrates this result.
While introducing abatement raises the value function at every state, the magnitude of the
shift is not the same everywhere. Thus the feasibility of abatement changes the slope of the
value function. An immediate implication is that introducing abatement may change the optimal
restoration trigger. To see why, recall that restoration occurs at the state where the value function
equals J(0) − C. Consider what happens as quality worsens from x = 0. The steeper is the value
function below x = 0, the sooner it will have declined by enough to make restoration worthwhile.
Figure 2 presents a case in which introducing abatement raises the optimal restoration trigger.
At ﬁrst glance this situation may seem counterintuitive: why are not restoration and abatement
always substitutes for one another? The reason is that introducing abatement may raise the value
function more at high levels of quality than at low levels. When quality is high, restoration is
distant, and abatement allows the manager to maintain quality at a higher level than would be
possible in its absence. Hence introducing abatement may raise the value function more at high
levels of quality than at low levels. If so, the restoration trigger must rise.
Diﬀerent circumstances, however, can produce the opposite result. Simulations demonstrate
that the availability of abatement lowers the restoration trigger for some parameter values, e.g.,
when mean ﬂow is suﬃciently low. The precise conditions under which the trigger falls or rises
p r o v i d ea na v e n u ef o rf u t u r er e s e a r c h .
In contrast, the potential for restoration always lowers abatement. To see this, consider the










10where the supremum is taken over abatement policies. Let aabate be the corresponding optimal
abatement policy. Using similar methods as in the proof of Theorem 1, one can show that Jabate < 0,
that Jabate(x)i sﬁnite for every x,a n dt h a tJabate is twice continuously diﬀerentiable and concave
with J0
abate unbounded above; moreover, an optimal policy aabate exists and uniquely satisﬁes
the Bellman equation corresponding to the value function Jabate. Theorem 2 describes the opti-
mal abatement policy in the absence of restoration. In particular, it states that abatement rises
monotonically as quality diminishes, up to the abatement ceiling ¯ a. One consequence is that an
expectation equilibrium always exists in the abatement-only case, as long as the abatement ceiling
is higher than the mean ﬂow rate.
Theorem 2 Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, and assume that restoration is not feasible. Then (i)
there exists a state ˆ x such that aabate is decreasing on (ˆ x,∞) and aabate(x)=a for all x ≤ ˆ x; (ii)
limx→∞ aabate(x)=0 ; and (iii) if ¯ a>µ ,then there exists a state x∗
abate such that µ<a abate(x) for
x<x ∗
abate and µ>a abate(x) for x>x ∗
abate.
Theorem 3 compares the optimal value functions and abatement policies in the abatement-only
case with those in the full SFQ case analyzed above.
Theorem 3 Let Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold. Then (i) J0 <J 0
abate; and (ii) for each state
x ∈ (x,∞),w h e r ex is the trigger point under restoration, either a(x) <a abate(x) or a(x)=
aabate(x)=a.
Assertion (i) states that the derivative of the value function — the marginal increase in the present
value of net beneﬁts as the resource’s state improves — is everywhere less in the abate-and-restore
case than in the abate-only case. The feasibility of restoration raises the value function everywhere,
since its absence represents a constraint on the resource manager. But the value function increases
more at low levels of quality, where restoration is imminent, than at high levels of quality, where
restoration is more distant.
Assertion (ii) establishes that the optimal abatement rate when restoration is available is less
than in the abate-only case, unless the abatement ceiling is binding. This result follows directly from
assertion (i). When restoration is possible, the present value of net beneﬁts (i.e., the value function
J(x)) increases more slowly as the state improves. Loosely speaking, the marginal gains from
abatement are lower. Hence less abatement is optimal. A corollary is that even if an expectation
equilibrium exists when restoration is feasible, it must occur at a lower level of quality. That is,
11x∗ <x ∗
abate. Thus the availability of restoration alters the optimal abatement policy, even when
the probability of its occurrence is very low.
Figure 3 summarizes this discussion, portraying optimal abatement policies with and without
the possibility of restoration. In the top panel, an expectation equilibrium exists when restoration
is available, but it occurs at a lower level quality than if restoration were not an option. The
bottom panel of Figure 3 illustrates a case in which restoration has a more drastic consequence
for the abatement path. No expectation equilibrium exists: at all values of x above x, abatement
merely slows — but never halts — the net ﬂow of damages. Rather than maintaining quality at a
certain level, the optimal policy lets damages accumulate until the trigger level is reached, and then
restores the resource. Which of the two cases portrayed in Figure 3 prevails depends on how fast
the resource deteriorates, as we discuss in the next section.17
3.3 The role of economic and environmental factors
In this section, we consider how the optimal policies just described vary with parameters of the
physical environment (in particular, the mean and variability of the rate of deterioration), the
nature of preferences (including the discount rate), and the costs of cleanup. We rely for the most
part on simulations for our results, since important relationships in the model are often complex,
hence resistant to straight analytic demonstrations. Where analytic results can be established, we
state them. We discuss a range of salient features of the model in turn: the value of the resource;
the abatement path, including the existence of an expectation equilibrium; the “trigger” state at
which restoration occurs; and the balance between restoration and abatement.
3.3.1 The value of the resource
It is straightforward to show that the higher are ﬂows, the lower is the value of the resource at
every quality level. Higher ﬂows mean greater deterioration in the resource, and hence bring both
lower utility and higher cleanup costs. The following theorem summarizes this point. The proof is
straightforward and hence omitted.
17A third possibility exists: the optimal abatement rate may equal average ﬂow at exactly one point, so that the
abatement function is tangent to the horizontal line at µ. The resulting “expectation equilibrium” x
∗ is then stable
from the right but not the left. For x>x
∗, abatement will be lower than µ and the state will tend to return to
x
∗.F o rx<x
∗ abatement will also be less than µ, implying that in expectation the quality level will decline to the
trigger level for restoration.
12Theorem 4 Let Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold. Let J(·,µ) be the optimal value function given a
drift rate µ>0. Then, for any x, J(x,µ) is decreasing in µ.
The eﬀect of the variance rate σ2 on the value function turns out to be ambiguous in the full
SFQ case. Thus it is useful to consider its role when only one of the cleanup options is feasible.
When only abatement is feasible, the value function Jabate is decreasing in σ2. In that case, the
value function is concave everywhere: hence by the usual Jensen’s Inequality arguments an increase
in variance lowers the value of the resource in expectation. This result is stated in the following
theorem, the proof of which is omitted.
Theorem 5 Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Let Jabate(·,µ,σ2) be the optimal value function given
t h ev a r i a n c er a t eσ2, when only abatement is feasible. Then, for any x, Jabate(x,µ,σ2) is decreasing
in σ2.
In the restoration-only case, the opposite result holds, as long as the resource manager is
suﬃciently patient. That is, Jrestore is increasing in σ2 for small enough values of the discount rate
α. In this case, the value function is convex near the restoration trigger, so the Jensen’s Inequality
argument no longer holds. Rather, the intuition behind the restoration-only result is as follows:
When ﬂows are more variable, we are more likely to have recently restored the resource at any
point in time, since the restoration threshold is more likely to have been crossed. Hence the greater
the variance, the more likely is the resource to be at a high level of quality. If the discount rate
is suﬃciently low, this exchange of more numerous cleanups for higher quality makes variability a
welcome companion: it raises the present value of expected utility.
Theorem 6 Let Assumptions 1 and 3 hold. Let Jrestore(·,σ2,α) be the optimal value function given
variance rate σ2 and discount rate α, when only restoration is feasible. Then, for any x,t h e r ee x i s t s
as c a l a rα > 0 such that for any α ∈ (0,α), Jrestore(x,σ2,α) is increasing in σ2.
Finally, the value of the resource declines with the costs of abatement and restoration, as must
be the case.
3.3.2 The abatement path
Figure 4 illustrates optimal abatement policies for three values of the mean ﬂow rate µ.N o t e
that the vertical axis measures the fraction of mean ﬂow abated, so that the abatement rates are
13normalized by the ﬂows.18 When the mean ﬂow rate is high, the cost of oﬀsetting it with abatement
is high as well. At the same time, high ﬂows mean that restoration will be more frequent, on average,
so that damages will persist in the environment for a shorter period of time before being cleaned
up. Hence at higher ﬂow rates, restoration becomes more attractive relative to abatement, and less
abatement is done.
Figure 5 depicts the eﬀects of the variance rate σ2 on the optimal abatement path. Note that
abatement reaches a higher maximum when the variability is lower. This is a consequence of
Jensen’s Inequality. Because abatement costs are convex, abatement becomes more expensive in
expectation as the variability rises.
The eﬀects of economic variables accord with intuition. When marginal abatement cost is higher,
the optimal abatement rate is lower at every state. Figure 6 illustrates this point, plotting optimal
abatement for a range of marginal cost functions (the parameter γ corresponds to the slope of the
linear marginal abatement cost function used in the simulations). The eﬀect of higher discount
rates, depicted in Figure 7, is perhaps more interesting. When the quality of the state is high, a
higher discount rate leads to less abatement — as might be expected. As the state deteriorates,
however, this relationship inverts: abatement becomes greater at higher discount rates, and thus
reaches a higher peak. Putting more weight on current relative to future utility results in more
abatement, because the beneﬁts from eventually restoring the resource are discounted more heavily.
This result is intuitive, and yet leads to a surprising conclusion. In conventional models of the
management of resource stocks, greater patience leads to more abatement in the near term, not
less. In the SFQ model, over a range of states a more patient manager will be more tolerant of
environmental degradation in the short run — because such tolerance will hasten restoration, and
raise environmental quality in the long run.
An important implication of these results is that the existence of an expectation equilibrium,
and thus the relevance of restoration, depends on the characteristics of the environment and of the
economic system. When ﬂows are high, or highly variable, an expectation equilibrium may not
exist in the full SFQ case. On the other hand, an expectation equilibrium always exists in the
abatement-only case, as we showed above. Similarly, when abatement is expensive or the discount
rate is low, an expectation equilibrium is less likely to exist when restoration is feasible. The
18The focus of our discussion is on the fraction of ﬂow abated, which clearly reaches a higher peak at low ﬂow rates
than at high ones. As Figure 4 shows, the peak of the abatement function may also be higher in absolute terms when
ﬂows are low. At a ﬂow rate of 3, for example, abatement rises to roughly one quarter of the ﬂow rate, or 0.75 in
absolute terms. At µ =1 .0, on the other hand, abatement exceeds 1.6 in absolute terms.
14availability of restoration matters most for management in such cases.
3.3.3 The restoration trigger
In the ﬁgures just discussed, the restoration trigger for each abatement path is the point at which
abatement falls to zero. In both panels of Figure 5, for example, the restoration trigger is lower
when ﬂows are more variable. In Figure 4, on the other hand, the eﬀect of the ﬂow rate on the
restoration trigger is ambiguous.
Figure 8 plots the restoration trigger against the ﬂow rate µ and the variance rate σ2,f o ra
particular range of parameter values. The top two panels represent two-dimensional projections,
showing how the trigger varies with one parameter or the other. (Note that µ decreases from left
to right in the top left panel, for consistency with the view in the bottom graph.) The lower panel
shows the three-dimensional surface over the same range. The restoration trigger is measured on
the vertical axis; notice that µ increases “into” the page, while σ2 increases from left to right.
When ﬂows are high enough, the restoration threshold is inversely related to both the ﬂow
rate and its variability. That is, higher ﬂows and greater variability both drive the restoration
trigger down. For example, when µ = 5 the trigger point x declines smoothly from −263 to just
under −270 as σ2 increases from 1 to 100. We oﬀer a heuristic explanation for this result, which
borrows from the theory of real options.19 Recall from Theorem 1 that the value function is convex
just above the restoration trigger, and ﬂat below it. Since the rate of deterioration is stochastic,
and restoration is an irreversible investment, there is an option value to waiting before restoring.
Just above the trigger, a favorable shock raises quality and expected utility. The “downside risk,”
however, is limited, since the cost of restoration is unaﬀected by quality. The resulting option value
represents a reward to waiting, and so leads to a lower restoration trigger. Moreover, the reward is
greater when ﬂows are more variable.
This result does not hold at all ﬂow levels, however. In particular, for low ﬂow rates (not shown
in Figure 8) an increase in variability raises the restoration trigger. We conjecture the following:
if an expectation equilibrium does not exist, the restoration trigger decreases monotonically with
the variability of ﬂows.20 When an expectation equilibrium exists (i.e., if ﬂows are low enough),
19See Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for a thorough discussion of option value in the context of dynamic stochastic
models of investment under uncertainty.
20Our conjecture is a statement of suﬃciency, not necessity. Simulations show that the trigger falls with variability
even in some cases with expectation equilibria. Indeed, for the lowest ﬂow depicted in Figure 8 (µ =1 .0), an
expectation equilibrium exists for almost all the entire range of σ
2.
15it interrupts the decline of quality towards the restoration trigger, and as a result may alter the
relationship between ﬂows and restoration.
The eﬀect of the ﬂow rate µ on the restoration trigger appears to follow a similar pattern. In
Figure 8, the trigger rises as mean ﬂow falls, down to µ =1 .5. Below that point, the trigger falls
with further decline in the ﬂow rate; indeed, the drop is precipitous from µ =1 .0t oµ =0 .5( n o t
s h o w no nt h eﬁgure). We conjecture that whether the restoration trigger increases or decreases in
the ﬂow rate depends on whether an expectation equilibrium exists.
The relationship between marginal abatement cost and the restoration trigger is similarly am-
biguous. However, the restoration trigger does appear to decline monotonically with the discount
rate. That is, the more weight is put on current rather than future welfare, the further the resource
is allowed to deteriorate before restoration occurs.
The eﬀect of restoration cost is unambiguous, and is stated in Theorem 7. As the cost of restora-
tion increases, the trigger level x decreases. As intuition would suggest, a higher cost increases the
incentive to delay restoration.
Theorem 7 Let x(C) denote the trigger level for a given restoration cost C>0. Then x(C) is
decreasing in C.
3.3.4 The optimal balance between restoration and abatement
So far we have focused on the particulars of the optimal policy, e.g., the peak of the abatement
path or the location of the restoration trigger. Here, we take a broader view and summarize the
eﬀects of economic and environmental variables in terms of the balance between abatement and
restoration.
Figure 9 shows how the importance of abatement relative to restoration varies with the ﬂow
rate. The horizontal axis measures the ﬂow rate. The vertical axis measures the time-averaged rate
of abatement as a fraction of the ﬂow of damages, or (equivalently) the fraction of total damages
that is cleaned up optimally by abatement rather than restoration. Thus for a given ﬂow rate,
the height of the curve represents the fraction of cleanup due to abatement. The remainder of the
cleanup, from the curve to the top of the graph, is due to restoration. For example, at a ﬂow rate of
3, approximately 20% of the total ﬂow of damages is cleaned up by abatement, with the remaining
80% cleaned up through periodic restorations.
Figure 9 also illustrates how the existence of an expectation equilibrium depends on the ﬂow
16r a t e .T h ed a s h e dl i n eo nt h eﬁgure marks the critical value of the ﬂow rate that determines whether
or not an expectation equilibrium exists. (In Figure 9, the critical value is just above 1.2.) For ﬂow
rates below this critical value, abatement oﬀsets expected ﬂows completely over some range, so that
an expectation equilibrium is reached. In this case restoration occurs with very small probability,
and virtually all of the damages are cleaned up through abatement. For low ﬂow rates, then, we
may say that abatement is the “principal strategy.” When ﬂows increase beyond this cutoﬀ,t h e
expectation equilibrium vanishes, and restoration becomes the principal strategy.
Similarly, restoration predominates as abatement becomes more costly. Figure 10 plots the
fraction of cleanup due to abatement against the marginal cost parameter γ. The pattern is similar
to that in Figure 9. As marginal cost becomes steeper, so that abatement cost rises more rapidly,
the fraction of cleanup achieved through abatement falls. Plotting the fraction of cleanup by
abatement against the variance rate σ2 would reveal a similar relationship. Greater variability of
ﬂows depresses the optimal abatement rate, just as higher ﬂows and more costly abatement do.
Hence the share of cleanup achieved by abatement falls as the variability rises. On the other hand,
an analogous plot of cleanup against the discount rate would yield the reverse relationship, with
abatement accounting for more cleanup as the discount rate increases.
A particularly interesting feature of the SFQ model is that the optimal balance between restora-
tion and abatement is highly sensitive to small changes in key parameters. Consider the eﬀects of
changes in the ﬂow rate around the “critical value” of 1.2, depicted in Figure 9. As the mean ﬂow
rate increases from 1.1t o1 .3, the fraction of cleanup produced by abatement drops dramatically,
from 0.9t o0 .6. Between µ =1a n dµ = 2, the abatement fraction falls from 0.97 to 0.33. The
optimal mix of cleanup methods is similarly sensitive to changes in marginal abatement cost, vari-
ability, and the discount rate, around the critical values that determine whether an expectation
equilibrium exists.
Whether cleanup relies more on restoration or on abatement determines how the quality of the
resource varies over time. Figure 11 plots the frequency distributions of states for three ﬂow rates.
When ﬂows are low, an expectation equilibrium is achieved. States close to this equilibrium level
are much more common than other states. Indeed, the peak of the frequency distribution for µ =1
occurs precisely at the expectation equilibrium (x = −185) depicted in Figure 4 for the same ﬂow
rate. At somewhat higher ﬂow rates, no expectation equilibrium exists, and restorations occur
more frequently. As a result, high-quality states become relatively more common, ﬂattening the
frequency distribution. For the moderate ﬂow rate depicted in the ﬁgure (µ =1 .5), the distribution
17retains a peak, occurring just above the point at which abatement reaches its maximum. At the
high ﬂow rate, restoration becomes even more important relative to abatement, and all states
between the initial quality level and the restoration point occur with roughly equal frequency.21
3.4 Extensions
3.4.1 Greater costs for greater restoration
We have assumed that restoration costs are “destination-driven,” in that they depend on ultimate
rather than initial quality. However, the results of the model hold for cost functions exhibiting
less extreme economies of scale. For example, suppose that the cost of restoring the resource to
state 0 starting from quality level x has a ﬁxed component F, as before, but also has a variable
component γ(x). We would expect γ(x) to be a decreasing function of x; i.e., the restoration cost
increases with the amount of restoration done. Total cost is given by C(x)=F + γ(x). Unless
J(0) − J(x) <C (x) for all x, restoration will be optimal for at least one state x.I fw en o wl e tx
denote the highest value of x at which restoration is optimal, then the system will evolve much as
i nt h ec a s ew i t ho n l yaﬁxed cost for restoration.
If γ(x) is convex, the restoration policy R may no longer be a convex set. Nonetheless, the
evolution of the system will be similar, since restoration will be triggered each time the state hits
x.( I fγ(x)i sc o n c a v e ,t h e nR will be a convex set as before.) When γ(x)i sc o n v e x ,t h ee x t e n to f
scale economies will clearly depend on the relative size of the ﬁxed cost F, and will determine how
far the state falls before restoration is undertaken.
3.4.2 Delayed restoration
In many real-world applications of the SFQ model, restoration is unlikely to be instantaneous. For
example, restoring a degraded habitat, such as the Everglades, may take several years. Similarly,
proposed methods to remove greenhouse gases from the atmosphere (e.g., seeding oceans with iron
ﬁlings to promote the growth of carbon-dioxide-absorbing plankton) would require long lead times.
Consider a generalization of the model formulated in Section 2, where a delay of length D
is incurred in restoration. During the interval [τi + D,τi+1) between the completion of the
21Figure 11 also demonstrates a seemingly paradoxical result: in the full SFQ case, when both restoration and
abatement are possible, the average quality of the resource may sometimes be higher when ﬂows are greater. When
the ﬂow of damages is high, restorations may become suﬃciently more frequent that high-quality states are more
common.
18ith restoration project and the commencement of the next, the state evolves according to xt =
R t



















(compare to equation (3)). Note that states observed during a restoration project do not enter
into equation (6). Instead, the restoration cost C now incorporates all costs incurred and utility
realized in the course of a restoration project. While the length of the delay is deterministic in this
model, the restoration cost could be random (in which case C would be the expected cost).
Our analysis can be extended to establish a generalization of Theorem 1. The only diﬀerence
is that the boundary condition stated in the ﬁrst part becomes J(x)=e−αDJ(0)−C for all x ≤ x.
The other results in this section continue to hold as well (in particular, Theorems 3 and 4.) A slight
modiﬁcation is needed to Theorem 7: in this model with delay, the trigger level x is nonincreasing
in C.22
4 SFQ problems in the environmental arena
In this section, we explore the implications of our theoretical model for the management of resource
stocks in the real world. First, we brieﬂy sketch the model’s application to a number of environ-
mental problems, ranging from accumulating waste to zebra mussels. We then consider the case of
the California condor in detail.
4.1 Environmental applications
The accumulation of wastes at disposal sites or generating facilities is a canonical SFQ problem.
Consider the optimal management of municipal solid waste, for example. The environmental quality
of a landﬁll site and the surrounding area diminishes as solid waste accumulates. The ﬂow of
waste may be slowed through recycling, composting, or waste reduction. Eventually, the landﬁll is
capped, the site is restored — perhaps becoming a park or recreation area — and quality returns to
22I nt h i sm o d e lo fd e l a y ,i ft h er e s t o r a t i o nc o s tC is suﬃciently low, the optimal policy will be to continually restore
t h er e s o u r c e—e ﬀectively avoiding the negative utility that comes from letting the resource deteriorate.
19its initial high level.23 In a typical scenario, waste diversion remains roughly constant over time,
or changes only with changing preferences (i.e., a desire to increase levels of recycling) or prices
(e.g., land becomes more expensive, or recycled materials become more valuable). Optimal waste
management, on the other hand, would vary the rate of abatement over time. When a landﬁll
is ﬁrst opened, diversion should be relatively high. That is because waste dumped early will be
around for nearly the landﬁll’s entire life. Thus, the discounted expected damages it imposes will
be high relative to the damages from garbage arriving later. As the landﬁll nears capacity, waste
diversion should slow, since the waste will impose damages only until the time of restoration.
Similar issues, on a diﬀerent time scale, are involved in the management of hazardous wastes.
Consider the chemistry department at Harvard University.24 The department’s laboratories accu-
mulate a variety of toxic and reactive substances. Storing such substances on campus heightens
health and ﬁre hazards.25 Removing the wastes for permanent disposal — “restoration,” in this
context — involves economies of scale, reﬂecting the ﬁxed costs of labor and transportation. Chem-
ical wastes are hauled away in “lab packs”: containers are collected from labs and packed in larger
drums with wastes of similar types. A 55-gallon drum of corrosive ﬂammable liquids costs $320 to
ship; a 30-gallon drum costs $215, and a single 5-gallon container $95.
At least in principle, several methods exist to control the ﬂow of lab waste generated. First, the
quantities of chemicals used could be curtailed. Doing so would require less suitable experiments,
fewer experimental trials, or greater eﬀorts to prevent spills. Second, laboratories could manage
their inventories more eﬃciently. Forgotten or misplaced stocks of unused chemicals linger on shelves
beyond expiration, while new chemical stocks are ordered. Separate storerooms for each lab lead
to redundant and excess quantities of chemicals. At some cost, inventories could be combined, or
managed to match use more closely. Finally, some fraction of the waste stream could be puriﬁed
and reused rather than thrown away, albeit at signiﬁcant cost.
23With solid waste management, successive waves of accumulation and restoration take place on a series of dump
sites, as opposed to the cyclical cleansing and soiling of a single resource. Our model could be extended to accommo-
date the multiple-site case by having the exposure costs and restoration costs rise as we move to successively more
expensive landﬁlls. Essentially, this would append results from the theory of nonrenewable resources to our models
(Dasgupta and Heal, 1979; Hotelling, 1931). Abatement today would be inﬂuenced by the shadow price of future
restorations.
24We thank Henry Littleboy, Health and Safety Oﬃc e r( f o rH a r v a r d ’ sF a c u l t yo fA r t sa n dS c i e n c e sO ﬃce of
Enviornmental Health Services), who oversees hazardous waste management in the Chemistry Department, and Dr.
Alan Long, Director of Laboratories, for their generosity in answering questions and providing information about
hazardous waste management in the Harvard chemistry department.
25Of course, chemical waste storage and disposal are heavily regulated by the Environmental Protection Agency.
For example, existing regulations prohibit the storage of waste longer than ninety days. At Harvard, the constraint
does not bind: limited storage space makes more frequent collection necessary.
20Although some abatement would likely be optimal, little concerted eﬀort is actually made to
curb ﬂows. A partial explanation is that until recently, individual laboratories were not charged for
disposal, and thus had little incentive to reduce their chemical use. Individual labs recently began
to pay a volume-based charge for both solvents and lab packs. Limited experience indicates that
the use of chemical wastes is fairly inelastic, suggesting high costs of substantial abatement.
Av e r yd i ﬀerent application is the sedimentation of reservoirs.26 The “stock” in this context is
the capacity of the reservoir, which is diminished as sediment ﬂows into the reservoir and accumu-
lates. Dams are commonly designed to have ﬁnite lives: the reservoir behind a dam ﬁlls up with
sediment, until the dam is retired. Retirement is costly in monetary and environmental terms, and
often requires the construction of a replacement dam. A range of strategies exists to abate the
sediment ﬂow. The ﬂow into the reservoir can be reduced by soil conservation, reforestation, and
other measures in the catchment area; or sediment can be routed away from the reservoir. A range
of restoration technologies also exists. Retirement and replacement constitute an extreme form
of restoration, and one whose costs are essentially destination-driven. Alternatively, the stock of
sediment can be removed directly by siphoning or dredging — activities likely to exhibit economies
of scale. Hence our SFQ model applies.
The precise nature of the optimal policy will depend on site-speciﬁc costs of stock and ﬂow
controls. Nonetheless, the common practice of letting sediment accumulate unchecked before retir-
ing the dam — equivalent to a restoration-only policy — is almost surely suboptimal. At the same
time, “sustainable management” that seeks to maintain an equilibrium by relying exclusively on
sediment ﬂow control, without periodic restoration (Palmieri, Shah, and Dinar 2001), is equally
unlikely to be optimal.
The SFQ model also applies to the control of animal pests, such as zebra mussels (Dreissena
polymorpha). These small freshwater mollusks were introduced to the U. S. accidentally, carried in
bilge water of cargo ships. They clog water intake and distribution systems by adhering in large
clusters to pumphouses, plumbing systems, and other pieces of equipment. The control of zebra
mussels by power plants, water works, and other large users of water in the Great Lakes area of
the United States has been estimated to have cost as much as $1 billion in the 1990s alone.27
The feasibility of preventing mussels from settling varies in diﬀerent parts of a power plant,
26The information about dam sedimentation is taken from Palmieri, Shah, and Dinar (2001).
27Personal communication, Charles O’Neill, Project Director, National Zebra Mussel Information Clearinghouse,
New York Sea Grant.
21and the control strategies vary accordingly. In the pumphouses of power plants, mussels grow on
walls, debris screens, valves, and pumps, obstructing the ﬂow of water. Mechanical measures to
remove them — physical scraping or “hydrolasing” with high-powered water hoses — involve high
ﬁxed costs: sending down a team of divers or even dewatering the pumphouse (thus shutting down
the plant). An (S,s) policy is followed. Mussels are allowed to settle and grow, and periodically
are removed. Removal is done every year or two in western Lake Erie, their densest habitat. Inside
the plumbing systems of power plants and water works, mussels are inaccessible to mechanical
removal, but chemical removal is feasible. In such locations, both ﬂow and stock controls are
employed. Continuous low-level chlorination of circulating water is an abatement policy. It kills
juvenile mussels, and inhibits their settlement. Periodic (annual or semi-annual) injections of high
concentrations of chlorine represent a restoration strategy used to kill oﬀ adult mussels that have
settled.28
Our model also applies well to the degradation of natural habitats such as the Florida Ev-
erglades, where natural features and both healthy and endangered species comprise the stock of
environmental quality. The area’s deterioration can be slowed by pollution prevention eﬀorts and
by reductions in agricultural and urban water use. Environmental quality can be restored by recre-
ating historical water ﬂows and reintroducing native species.29 Of course, rerouting freshwater ﬂows
to the Everglades will require large construction projects, and the eﬀects will not be immediate.
Thus the appropriate SFQ model incorporates delay. The same point holds more generally for
the restoration of natural habitats or endangered species populations, such as the condor example
discussed in the next section. Nonetheless, the core methodological lessons of the model apply, as
we showed in Section 3.4.2 above.
28Continuous chlorination is typically eﬀective enough that additional periodic treatments are unnecessary. This
m a yb es e e na sa ni n s t a n c ew h e r eﬂow control measures maintain a high-quality expectation equilibrium, and restora-
tions are extremely rare. Nonetheless, if zebra mussel settlement were to occur (due, perhaps, to a breakdown in the
chlorination regime), a one-time injection of chlorine at higher concentrations would be employed as a restoration
measure.
29W h i l ew eh a v em o d e l e dac y c l eo fc l e a n u pa n dd e t e r i o r a t ion, in some real world cases (such as the Everglades)
restoration is likely to be done only once, after which the process of environmental degradation stops. Nonetheless,
the implications of the model are reasonably clear for such cases: starting from an already degraded state, we abate
at the margin (if possible) and then eventually restore all at once. In order for one-time restoration to be optimal,
however, there would presumably need to be a nonconvexity in beneﬁts, or at least very high marginal damages from
the ﬁrst few units of degradation.
Note also that while many real-world restorations are treated as “one-time-only” events, they are better modeled
as combined abatement-restoration policies in which an expectation equilibrium exists at a fairly high level of envi-
ronmental quality — implying that the probability that the resource quality declines far enough to trigger restoration
is very small, but not zero. For example, a manager who cleans up a river may not expect to do so again. The
possibility remains — however slight — that unforeseen changes in water currents or waste generation will create the
need for future restorations.
224.2 California condor restoration
One of the most prominent eﬀorts at endangered species restoration has been the successful re-
covery of the California condor (Gymnogyps californianus). With a wingspan of nine and a half
feet, the condor is the largest bird in North America. Until the mid-nineteenth century the con-
dor’s range extended as far north as the Columbia River Gorge and south into Baja California.30
Throughout the twentieth century the population declined precipitously; in crisis years, it fell from
approximately 100 birds in the 1940s to 22 in 1982. The decline appears to have been due to
reduced reproduction (perhaps a result of DDT) and to human-created mortality, including lead
poisoning from bullets in game carcasses, hazards from man-made structures such as powerlines,
and the shooting of the condors themselves.
The condor was recognized as “endangered” by the Federal government in 1967. The ensuing
recovery plan, approved in 1979, recommended captive breeding of condors to aid recovery. After
a disastrous winter of 1984-85, when six of the remaining ﬁfteen wild condors died, the U. S. Fish
and Wildlife Service decided to capture all of the remaining wild birds for the captive breeding
program. The reintroduction program was launched in 1992 with the release of two captivity-born
juveniles into the Sespe Condor Sanctuary in Los Padres National Forest. By October of 2003, the
wild population had climbed to 83 birds, including one chick hatched in the wild.
The captive breeding program exempliﬁes restoration with economies of scale. The costs of cap-
tive breeding are largely ﬁxed: the costs of developing a program to capture the birds, maintaining
the condor populations in captivity, and releasing condors back into the wild do not change greatly
on the margin with the number of birds released. Abatement measures include the provision of
food carcasses such as stillborn calves (to prevent lead exposure); promotion of alternatives to lead
in ammunition; prohibitions on shooting the condors; protection of suitable habitats; and attempts
to limit injuries from powerlines and other human structures. Each of these measures potentially
helps slow or oﬀset some portion of the decline in the condor population. Arranging them in order
of increasing cost per condor saved, as eﬃcient policy requires, produces an increasing marginal
abatement cost curve.
Simulating the optimal management policy for the condor requires estimating the restoration
cost, abatement cost, and utility functions. We estimated the costs of restoration and abatement
using detailed program cost estimates in the Recovery Plan (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 1996).
30The diaries of Meriwether Lewis and William Clark report several sightings of the “Buzzard of the Columbia” in
1805 and 1806.
23Details of how this was done can be found in Appendix C. The expected ﬂow rate µ was set to
2.9 condors per year, equal to the average annual rate of decline of the condor population over the
decades prior to restoration, based on wild condor censuses.
Because no studies exist of willingness to pay for condor populations, we took point estimates
from two studies of the value of bald eagle populations (Boyle and Bishop 1987; Stevens et al.,
1991). We divided each estimate by 10 to yield two more estimates, and then multiplied by the
current U. S. Sierra Club membership of 700,000. We thus arrived at four point estimates of total
annual willingness to pay ranging from $1.1 million to $23 million. A concave utility function
was ﬁtted to each point estimate, assuming that the willingness to pay for a wild population of
zero birds is zero.31 These estimates are deliberately conservative. The low estimate assumes that
Sierra Club members — and only Sierra Club members — would each be willing to pay only $1.53
annually to preserve a population of three hundred birds, and would pay a maximum of $1.75 for
an arbitrarily large population. In the highest-valuation case, annual per-capita willingness to pay
would never exceed $37, again for an arbitrarily large number of condors.32
Figure 12 illustrates simulated optimal abatement polices for these four estimates of willingness
to pay. At the lowest valuation, the simulated optimal abatement path is essentially tangent to the
horizontal line at the mean ﬂow rate of 2.9, with the peak occurring at a population of 138 condors.
(Abatement rates, like ﬂows, are measured in condors per year.) At higher valuations, optimal
abatement exceeds mean ﬂow over a signiﬁcant range. The resulting “expectation equilibria” occur
at populations of between two and three hundred condors.
Of greatest interest are the optimal trigger levels for restoration suggested by the model. Recall
that the trigger levels represent the quality level of the resource at which the gain in the value
function just exactly equals the cost of restoration. In this context, therefore, restoration is optimal
when the present value (discounted expected utility) of the wild condor population falls $15 million
below the value associated with the population once restored. The trigger levels in our simulations
correspond to populations of 85, 149, 189, and 205 condors. For comparison, the actual condor
population in the wild fell to 15 birds before restoration was undertaken.
To explore the sensitivity of our conclusions to the parameter assumptions, we ran Monte Carlo
31We used a utility function that exhibits much more rapidly diminishing marginal utility for condor populations
than some results in the literature on endangered species valuations have suggested. For example, a meta-analysis by
Loomis and White (1996) suggests a utility function of the form ax
b with b =0 .8 — a function that results in WTP
estimates for large populations that are orders of magnitude greater than ours.
32The cost of a regular Sierra Club membership in 2003 was $39.
24simulations varying three parameters: per-capita willingness to pay, an abatement cost parameter,
and the variability of the ﬂow rate. (See Appendix C for details.) The resulting abatement policies
are illustrated by Figure 13. The four draws depicted in the ﬁgure are chosen to represent various
cases within a 95% conﬁdence region based on the joint distribution of the maximum abatement
rate, average abatement rate, and restoration trigger. They represent a “mean” or central path
(the darkest line), along with the draw with the lowest peak; the draw with the lowest average
abatement rate; and a draw with high values for both peak and abatement rate. The central policy
reaches a maximum abatement rate of 3.4 condors per year, with an average of 1.1. That policy
exhibits an expectation equilibrium at a population of 246 condors. The restoration triggers in the
95% conﬁdence region vary from 92 to 193 birds, with a mean of 164.
Hence over a wide range of parameters, our model suggests that the condor population was al-
lowed to fall much too far before restoration was undertaken. Indeed, a farsighted policy might have
resulted in a expectation equilibrium population of a few hundred birds, resorting to restoration
only if several bad shocks reduced the population far enough.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In a wide range of settings, both stocks and ﬂows can be controlled to improve the quality of a
resource. If so, the SFQ model applies. Managing the resource entails abating the downward drift
in quality and periodically restoring the stock. These strategies are interdependent. The opti-
mal balance between them depends on characteristics of the physical environment, the nature of
preferences (in particular the discount rate), and the costs of cleanup. If ﬂows are low enough or
abatement is suﬃciently inexpensive, an “expectation equilibrium” may be reached where abate-
ment eﬀorts just oﬀset the expected deterioration of the resource. In that case, abatement is the
principal cleanup strategy, although the optimal abatement rate is still lowered by the potential for
restoration. When deterioration is more rapid or more variable, when abatement is more expensive,
or when restoration is less costly, the optimal policy relies more on restoration.
This model has broad relevance for the management of resource stocks in the real world. We
have discussed a range of applications in the environmental arena: the disposal of municipal solid
waste and hazardous laboratory waste; the prevention of siltation in reservoirs; the control of pests
such as zebra mussels; the regeneration of natural habitats such as the Florida Everglades; and the
recovery of the endangered California condor. Note that these problems involve private decisions
25(lab wastes), public decisions (municipal solid waste), and situations where the public and private
sectors interact, often in a regulatory context.
The analysis generalizes readily to the management of physical and human capital. Optimal
policies for replacing a machine, investing in capital equipment, or purchasing consumer durables
cannot be derived independently of the optimal maintenance paths. Indeed, how far the produc-
tivity of capital should be allowed to fall before replacement depends not only on how costly is
replacement but also on how rapid and variable is deterioration. Similarly, from the perspective
of the ﬁrm, investment in human capital presents an SFQ problem. Workers age, tire, and burn
out. In industries with rapid technological advance, workers’ skills quickly obsolesce. A ﬁrm can
train its workers to maintain their productivity, but at some point it may lay oﬀ its older workers,
or reassign them to tasks where the latest technical skills are less essential and replace them with
recently trained workers. In this context training is “abatement” and replacement — which incurs
costs such as severance payments or raised experience-rated unemployment insurance — amounts
to restoration.
Government will likely play a role in many SFQ problems, e.g., in controlling environmental
quality, and must understand the central lesson: that stock and ﬂow controls should be coordinated
a n di m p l e m e n t e dj o i n t l yw h e nb o t ha r ef e a s i b l e . When restoration is an option, maintaining a
resource stock at a constant level (by abating ﬂows) will be more expensive than achieving the
same present value of expected utility from quality, but allowing quality to vary over time. A policy
relying solely on restoration will not only restore too frequently (since deterioration is unchecked),
but will also allow quality to fall too far before each restoration (since the optimal trigger rises
when abatement is available).
These errors are likely to be relevant to real-world environmental policies that utilize only one
cleanup strategy or the other. For example, endangered species laws in the United States allow
animal populations to fall to critical levels before government intervenes. Costly and risky restora-
tions, such as the condor restoration currently underway, are one consequence. A better policy
would seek to stem population decline much earlier, for example by giving landowners incentives to
maintain appropriate habitat. Moreover, such abatement activity would attain its maximum while
the species population remained moderately high, and would decrease as the population declined
and restoration neared. Even where abatement measures have been employed as a complement to
restoration, they typically emerge only when the situation is already dire. Similarly, environmen-
tal policies towards hazardous waste tend to emphasize terminal cleanup and permanent storage
26(restoration) rather than slowing waste generation. The Harvard example is instructive here, as
for years the university focused almost exclusively on hauling wastes away and largely overlooked
methods for curbing their generation.
Regulation of air and water pollution, on the other hand, tends to focus on emissions rather
than the resulting quality level in the environment. Where only ﬂows matter, or restoration is
unavailable, such an emphasis is optimal. But when pollution accumulates, policies should adjust
if restoration is a possibility, either technologically or politically. For example, imagine that an
economic technology is developed (some time in the future) to remove carbon dioxide from the
atmosphere. In such a scenario, optimal abatement of carbon dioxide emissions would fall, and
restoration would eventually take place if carbon dioxide levels climbed suﬃciently.
In other realms, government may intervene in SFQ problems by directly aﬀecting the balance
between maintenance and restoration. For example, zoning regulations often treat new construction
much diﬀerently than modiﬁcation of existing structures, eﬀectively imposing additional costs on
restoration relative to maintenance. Similarly, environmental regulations that exempt existing
sources of pollution from stringent regulations — a practice known as “grandfathering” — create
incentives for ﬁrms to maintain old and ineﬃcient plants rather than replacing them with new
ones, distorting optimal decision-making.
While we have pointed out the parallels between our approach and the classic (S,s)m o d e la t
points, we have not exploited them fully. A natural extension of this work, therefore, would be to
introduce ﬂow control into the standard (S,s) model. As we have already noted, that model can
provide the basis for understanding capital investment and durable goods purchases; it also under-
girds macroeconomic models of price adjustment (Sheshinski and Weiss 1977) and cash holdings of
individuals (Baumol 1952; Tobin 1956). Incorporating ﬂow control into the (S,s)m o d e l—f o l l o w i n g
methods outlined here — could allow for a much richer theoretical description of a wide range of
economic phenomena and public policy issues.
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30Appendix A: Proofs of Theorems
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1





is ﬁn i t e .W eh a v ee s t a b l i s h e dA s s e r t i o n( i ) .
Because restoration sets the state to 0 and costs C, J(x) ≥ J(0) − C for all x,a n da no p t i m a l
policy R can be deﬁned to be the set of all x such that J(x)=J(0)−C. Let us establish that any
optimal policy R is nonempty — that at some level of environmental quality the manager restores
the resource. Assume, for contradiction, that the optimal restoration policy R is empty. Then,
we would have J(x)=s u p a Ea
x
£R ∞
t=0 e−αt(u(xt) − c(a(xt)))dt
¤
. It is easy to see that J would be
unbounded below, contradicting the fact that J(x) ≥ J(0) − C.
By straightforward sample-path arguments, it is easy to show that J is continuous and nonde-
creasing. Hence, there exists a state x such that J(x)=J(0)−C for all x ≤ x and J(x) >J(0)−C
for all x>x , establishing Assertion (ii).
It follows from Theorem 3 on page 39 of Krylov (1980) that J is twice continuously diﬀerentiable






J00(x)+( a − µ)J0(x) − αJ(x)+u(x) − c(a)
!
=0
for all x>x . Hence, Assertions (iii) and (iv) are valid. It is easily veriﬁed by sample-path
arguments that J is increasing on (x,∞) (Assertion (v)).
It follows from Assertions (ii) and (iii) that J0(x) = 0. Since J0(x) > 0 for all x>x ,w eh a v e
J00(x) > 0 on some range x ∈ (x,y)f o rs o m ey>x . Furthermore, since J is bounded above, J00(x)
must be negative for some x>x , and by continuity of the second derivative, there is a well—deﬁned
minimal inﬂection point x† =m i n {x>x |J00(x)=0 }, which by deﬁnition satisﬁes Assertions (vi)
and (vii).
Now consider an optimal policy. Assertion (ii) implies that the restoration component of an
optimal policy is given by R∗ =( −∞,x]. Let a function fx be deﬁned for x>xby fx(a)=
aJ0(x) − c(a). Note that f00




is uniquely attained by some a ∈ [0,¯ a]. For each state x>x ,l e ta∗(x)b et h ev a l u ea t t a i n i n gt h e
31supremum, and note that (a∗,R ∗) constitutes an optimal policy since the values a∗(x) also attain
the supremum in the Hamilton—Jacobi—Bellman equation (equation 4). This validates Assertions
(ix) and (xi). Moreover, for any x,y ∈ (x,x †)w i t hx<y , f0
y(a∗(x)) >f 0
x(a∗(x)) = 0, since J00 > 0
on (x,x †). Consequently, unless a∗(x)=a,w eh a v ea∗(y) >a ∗(x). An entirely analogous argument
establishes that a∗(y) <a ∗(x)i fx† <x<yand a∗(y) 6= a. Assertion (x) follows.
We are left with the task of establishing Assertion (viii). Given scalars ∆ > 0a n dx>x † + ∆,
we deﬁne two processes
x−




s ) − µ)dt + σwt,
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s ) − µ)dt + σwt,
each evolving on [0,τ], where τ is given by
τ =i n f{t|x−










s ))/2 − µ
¶
dt + σwt,
and note that xt =( x+
t +x−
t )/2f o ra l lt ∈ [0,τ] . It is easy to show that τ is ﬁnite with probability
one.

































where ω denotes the sample path of the underlying Brownian motion wt.





ˆ J+(x,ω)+ ˆ J−(x,ω)
´
.
We consider two separate cases that together comprise a set of probability 1. The ﬁrst is when
32x−
τ 6= x†.I n t h i s e v e n t , w e h a v e x−
τ = x+
τ = xτ >x †, and the desired inequality follows directly
from concavity of u and convexity of c.
The second case is when x−
τ = x†. Given our assumptions on c , the fact that a∗ is bounded
above, and the fact that J is bounded and twice continuously diﬀerentiable on (x,∞), it can be
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ˆ J+(x,ω)+ ˆ J−(x,ω)+o(∆2)
´
,
where the second—to—last expression relies on the fact that J00(x†)=0a n dt h a tx+
τ − x† = O(∆).
It follows that for almost all ω and any x ∈ (x†,∞), ˆ J(x,ω)i sc o n c a v ei nx.
By Bellman’s principle of optimality, we have
J(x)=E[ ˆ J−(x,ω)],J (x +2 ∆)=E[ ˆ J+(x,ω)], and J(x + ∆) ≥ E[ ˆ J(x,ω)].
Hence,







and therefore J00(x) < 0f o rx>x †.
q.e.d.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m2
Proof. For notational convenience, in this proof we shall write ˜ J for Jabate,a n dl i k e w i s ef o r˜ a.L e t
˜ fx be deﬁned by
˜ fx(a)=a ˜ J0(x) − c(a),
and let ˜ a(x)b et h ev a l u ei n[ 0 ,a] that uniquely attains the supremum of ˜ fx. Along similar lines
as in the proof of Theorem 1, one can show that ˜ J0(x) > 0, implying ˜ f0
x(0) > 0. Also recall that
33˜ f00




Since ˜ f00 ≤− ², the supremum is always attained by some z ∈ (0,∞). Let b(x) denote the optimum
for a given state x.B e c a u s e˜ f0
x(0) > 0, b(x) > 0. Furthermore, since ˜ f0
x(z) decreases as x increases,
b is decreasing.
It is easy to see that ˜ a(x)=m i n ( b(x),a). Since ˜ J0 is unbounded below, for any z>0t h e r e
exists a state x such that ˜ f0
x(z) > 0, implying that b is unbounded above, and therefore, there exists
a state ˆ x such that ˜ a(x)=a for x ≤ ˆ x. Assertion (i) follows.
Recall that ˜ J<0a n d ˜ J0 > 0, so that limx→∞ ˜ J0(x) = 0. Hence for any z>0, there exists a
state x such that ˜ f0
x(z) < 0, implying that limx→∞ b(x) = 0 and that Assertion (ii) holds. The fact
that b is decreasing implies that there exists a state x∗ such that µ<b (x)f o rx<x ∗ and µ>b (x)
for x>x ∗.S i n c eµ<a by hypothesis, we have Assertion (iii).
q.e.d.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m3
Proof. We continue to write ˜ J for Jabate. As a step toward establishing Assertion (i), we will show
that ˜ J<J . It is easy to see that ˜ J0 ≤ J . From Theorem 1, we have J0(x)=0< ˜ J0(x). This
implies that ˜ J(x) <J (x). For x<x ,w et h e nh a v eJ(x)=J(x) > ˜ J(x) > ˜ J(x). For x>x,o n
the other hand, the fact that ˜ J(x) <J (x) follows from our observation that ˜ J(x) <J (x) coupled
with standard sample-path arguments.
Consider two states y and z with x ≤ y<z . By Bellman’s principal of optimality (see, e.g.,
Krylov), we have























e−αt(u(xt) − c(a(xt)))dt + e−ατJ(y)
¸
,
where τ is the ﬁrst time at which xt = y. (The ﬁnal equality holds because xt >xfor t ≤ τ.)
34Let ˜ a be an optimal policy for the case where only abatement is possible. We then have































e−ατ(J(y) − ˜ J(y))
i
<J (y) − ˜ J(y).
It follows that J0 < ˜ J0, which gives us Assertion (i).
Now turn to Assertion (ii). Again, let ˜ fx be deﬁned by ˜ fx(a)=a ˜ J0(x) − c(a). Recall that for
any x, the supremum of ˜ fx is uniquely attained by ˜ a(x). Since ˜ J0 >J 0, for every x>x ,w eh a v e
˜ f0
x(a∗(x)) >f 0
x(a∗(x)). This implies that if a∗(x) < a then ˜ a(x) >a ∗(x). Hence, we have Assertion
(ii).
q.e.d.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m6
Proof. Without loss of generality, we will assume in this proof that σ ≥ 0. Recall that damage
evolves according to zt = µt−σwt.C o n s i d e raﬁxed restoration threshold ˜ x<0, which may or may
not correspond to the optimal restoration strategy. We introduce some notation to facilitate our
analysis. First, we denote the running maximum of damage by mt =m a x τ∈[0,t] zτ.T h e n u m b e r
of restorations carried out up to time t is rt = b−mt/˜ xc. Given only knowledge of zt, the tightest
lower bound on rt is rt = b−zt/˜ xc. The state can be written as xt = −zt − rt˜ x. If we carried out
rt rather than rt restorations, the state would be yt = −zt − rt˜ x.
Let J˜ x(·,σ,α) be the value function corresponding to a restoration threshold ˜ x.S i n c ext reaches

































where the ﬁnal term follows from the fact that the expected interarrival time between visits to ˜ x is
−µ˜ x.
We will now establish that limα↓0 αJ˜ x(x,σ,α)i si n c r e a s i n gi nσ.N o t e t h a t ( xt,y t,r t − rt)
together form an ergodic process. There is a joint stationary distribution over the variables xt,
yt,a n drt − rt such that if (x0,y 0,r 0 − r0) is sampled from this distribution, (xt,y t,r t − rt)i sa
stationary process. Let E∞ denote expectation with respect to the distribution of this stationary
process. It is easy to see that, for any t, the marginal distribution (with respect to the stationary








































u(yt − (rt − rt)˜ x)dt
¯ ¯ ¯yt = y
#
dy.
Note that, conditioned on z0 and zt, the process zτ forms a Brownian bridge on τ ∈ [0,t]. A sample
path argument shows that for any γ > max(z0,z t), Pr{mt ≥ γ|z0,z t} is increasing in σ.I tf o l l o w s
that for any γ > max(z0,z t), Pr{mt −zt ≥ γ|z0,z t} is increasing in σ, and therefore, for any γ ≥ 1,
Pr{rt − rt ≥ γ|z0,z t} is increasing in σ. Since this holds for all z0 and zt,a n dyt is a deterministic





u(yt − (rt − rt)˜ x)dt
¯ ¯ ¯yt ∈ dy
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is increasing in σ. It follows that that limα↓0 αJ˜ x(x,σ,α)i si n c r e a s i n gi nσ.
It is not hard to show that for any x>˜ x and any α > 0, J˜ x(x,σ,α) is continuously diﬀerentiable
in ˜ x and σ, and we will take this as given. Let x(σ,α) denote the optimal threshold as a function
of σ and α.I t c a n b e s h o w n t h a t x(σ,α) is continuously diﬀerentiable in σ, and we take this as


























We have already shown that, for any x and σ > 0, limα↓0 αJ˜ x(x,σ,α)i si n c r e a s i n gi nσ.I tf o l l o w s













P r o o fo fT h e o r e m7
Proof. Let J(x,C) denote the optimal value of state x given a restoration cost C>0. It is easy
to show by a sample path argument that for any x, J(x,C) is decreasing in C.F i xC2 >C 1 > 0

















e−ατ (J(x(C2),C 2) − J(x(C2),C 1))
¤
<J (0,C 1)+J(x(C2),C 2) − J(x(C2),C 1).
It follows that
J(0,C 2) − J(x(C2),C 2) <J(0,C 1) − J(x(C2),C 1) ≤ J(0,C 1) − J(x(C1),C 1), (9)
where the ﬁnal inequality relies on our assumption that x(C2) ≥ x(C1).
37Theorem 1 asserts that for any C>0,J (0,C)−J(x(C),C)=C. Inequality 9 therefore implies
that C2 <C 1, which yields a contradiction.
q.e.d.
Appendix B: Numerical simulations in Section 3
The computations that generated Figures 1-11 in Section 3 were conducted using a quadratic
function for abatement cost and a negative natural exponential function for utility. The functional
forms and parameter values used are summarized in Table B1. The ﬂow rate µ is not given in the
table: it varied as indicated in the ﬁgures and the text. The variance rate σ2,the marginal cost
parameter γ, and the discount rate α also vary in some ﬁgures, as indicated.
Value functions were computed via policy iteration on a “locally consistent” approximating
Markov chain (see, e.g., Kushner and Dupuis, 1992). Most simulations required only 10 iterations
to converge to a solution, although more iterations were used in some cases.
Table B1. Parameter values and functional forms for ﬁgures.
variance rate σ2 =9 .0
discount rate α =0 .005
restoration cost C = 13000
abatement ceiling a =2 0
abatement cost c(a)=γa2 γ =4 0
utility u(x)=−e−βx+κ β =0 .05
κ = −7.5
Appendix C: Simulation of optimal condor restoration policy
Base simulations
Utility
Four estimates of per-capita annual willingness to pay were used, drawn from studies of willingness
to pay for bald eagle populations, as discussed in the text: (i) Stevens et al. 1991 ($32.94 for
a population of 130); (ii) Boyle and Bishop 1987 ($15.34 for a population of 300); (iii) Stevens
et al. times 1/10 ($3.29 for 130); and (iv) Boyle and Bishop times 1/10 ($1.53 for 300). Each
38of these estimates was multiplied by 700,000 — the U. S. membership of the Sierra Club — to
yield an estimate of total annual willingness to pay. We assumed that the willingness to pay for
zero birds was zero. For utility functions throughout the condor simulations we used a negative
exponential function of the form −e−βx+κ, with the scaling parameter κ chosen to exhibit fairly
rapid diminishing marginal returns. These assumptions then determined a value of β corresponding
to each measure of willingness to pay. In the computations, the restoration point was normalized to
be zero, and negative values of x were considered (as in the model of Section 3). For the purposes
of exposition, we re-normalized the restoration point to 300 birds, and added the same number to
every state in order to represent condor populations as positive numbers.
Cost
We estimated the costs of restoration and abatement using detailed program cost estimates in the
Recovery Plan (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 1996). Recommended actions in the Plan were
categorized as related to abatement or restoration. Restoration costs were simply summed (in
present-value terms), resulting in an estimate of C =$15 million to restore the population to a
size of 300 birds (the target wild population that has been adopted by the Fish and Wildlife
Service). For each abatement action, average cost (per condor per year) was estimated taking into
account historical rates of decline in condor population and the priority accorded that action by the
Service.33 These unit costs were then arranged in increasing order, and a polynomial cost function
was ﬁtted to them. For the expected ﬂow rate in the absence of abatement, µ, we used the average
annual rate of decline of the condor population over the decades prior to restoration, based on wild
condor censuses.
Restoration cost was determined from the 1996 Condor Recovery Plan (U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service 1996). The abatement cost function was generated by estimating unit costs for a number of
protective actions recommended in the recovery plan and ﬁtting a cubic polynomial to the resulting
data. Estimates of the denominator (“abatement rate” or number of condors saved per year) were
derived from the priority hierarchy attached to the various protective measures. Thus “Priority
1” actions, considered necessary to prevent extinction of the species, were taken to have greater
eﬀect than “Priority 2” actions (declared necessary to prevent signiﬁcant decline) or “Priority
33Thus “Priority 1” actions, considered necessary to prevent extinction of the species, were taken to have greater
eﬀect than “Priority 2” actions (declared necessary to prevent signiﬁcant decline) or “Priority 3” (necessary for full
recovery). A table of the actions and associated costs is presented in Appendix C.
393” (necessary for full recovery). The abatement actions, along with their assigned priorities and
associated unit costs, are presented in Table C1.
The speciﬁc functional forms and parameter values used in the simulation are summarized in
Table C2. All dollar values are in constant 1996 terms. All costs are expressed in thousands of
dollars.
Monte Carlo simulations
We performed 222 simulations where the utility parameter β, the cost parameter γ2,a n dt h ev a r i -
ability σ2 were the result of random draws from independent normal distributions. The random
variables were generated by Matlab’s pseudo-random number generator, with each draw repre-
senting three randomly chosen variables from ten supplied by the number generator. (In fact, we
drew 225 parameter vectors and discarded three with negative values for the parameters; hence the
distributions, strictly speaking, were truncated rather than truly normal. However, the truncation
seems minimal enough that we can safely ignore its eﬀects on inference from the simulations.) The
parameters γ2 and σ were drawn directly from the distributions given in Table C3. In the case of β
the random parameter was per capita annual WTP, drawn from a normal distribution centered on
$7.70, equal to one-half the Boyle and Bishop estimate; this was chosen as a conservative estimate
that still allowed ample room for variance. For each draw of WTP, say ˆ u, β was computed by using
the functional form u(x)=−eβx+5, setting u(300) − u(0) = ˆ u (recall that 300 corresponds to the
total bird population that the Boyle and Bishop study was based on), and solving for β.
We calculated the “average” abatement rate as the average over states for which abatement
is positive. Note that it is computed over states themselves without taking into account the
probabilities of those states being reached. We treated the average and maximum abatement
and the trigger level x as three variables, and computed a joint 95% conﬁdence region using the
Wald statistic
Wi =( θi−θ0)
0 ˆ V−1 (θi−θ0),
where θi is the 3×1 vector of the values of the three variables for draw i, θ0 is the vector of sample
means, and ˆ V is the sample covariance matrix. The 95% conﬁd e n c er e g i o nw a st h es e to fd r a w s
for which Wi < 7.82, the critical value for the χ2 distribution with three degrees of freedom.
The results of the Monte Carlo estimation are summarized in Table C4.
Table C1. Abatement measures and costs for condor simulation.
40Prioritya Abatement measure Annual cost Average cost
($000/yr) ($000/condor-yr)
1 Protect habitat in S.W. Kern Co. 1 7
1 Protect habitat on Tejon Ranch 1 7
2 Protect habitat in Glenville Woody Area 1 8
2 Protect habitat near San Juan Creek 1 8
1 Provide information to private landowners 1 11
1 Protect nest sites 2 14
1 Protect roost sites 2 14
2 Manage condor foraging habitat 2 16
3 Protect habitat in Tulare County Grasslands 1 20
1 Provide information to land managers 2 21
1 Ongoing contaminant-related activities 20 30
2 Reestablish native ungulates 4 32
1 Protect Elkhorn Hill and Caliente Range areas 5 35
3 Provide dead livestock on rangelands 4 36
3 Assess historical ﬁndings 2 40
1 Distribute educational material 5 53
2 Establish observation points 5 53
3 Restrict aircraft 1 54
3 Perform federal land use planning 3 60
1 Protect habitat near Bitter Creek 10 70
3 Perform local and use planning 4 80
3 Hold training sessions 2 108
1 Protect habitat in Canizo and Elkhom Plains 20 140
1 Modify human-made structures (powerlines) 105 210
3 Step up enforcement of relevant laws 5 270
3 Protect habitat on Hopper Mtn. 20 400
Notes: a. Priority accorded abatement measures in the 1996 Recovery Plan from 1 (highest) to 3 (lowest).
Table C2. Parameter values and functional forms for condor simulations.
41mean ﬂow rate µ =2 .9
variance rate σ2 =9 .0
discount rate α =0 .05
restoration cost C = 15000
abatement cost c(a)=γ1 ∗ a2 + γ2 ∗ a3 γ1 =0
γ2 =4 . 2 2 3
utility u(x)=−e−βx+κ κ =5 .0
Boyle & Bishop x 0.1 β = 0.00704
Stevens et al. x 0.1 β = 0.01018
Boyle & Bishop β = 0.01433
Stevens et al. β = 0.01720





Table C4. Summary of Monte Carlo simulations: Outcomes in 95% conﬁdence region.
Standard
Variable Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
maximum abatement rate 3.4 0.4 2.7 4.5
average abatement rate 1.1 0.1 0.9 1.4

















































Expected flow rate      µ = 1.2 
Expectation    
equilibrium    
Restoration
trigger    
Unstable       
equilibrium    
x**  x* 
Figure 1: Optimal abatement path and corresponding value function. Note the diﬀerent scales on
the positive and negative segments of the vertical axis.
























Restoration trigger increases 
when abatement is available.  
With abatement 
Without abatement 
Figure 2: Value functions with and without the availability of abatement.
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Expected flow rate   µ=1.7
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Figure 3: Eﬀects of restoration on optimal abatement policy, for two ﬂow rates.




































Low flow  
µ = 1.0 
Moderate flow
µ = 1.5    
High flow  µ = 3.0 
Figure 4: Fraction of ﬂow optimally abated as a function of quality, for three ﬂow rates.

































Expected flow rate   µ = 1.2 
































2 = 100 Expected flow rate   µ = 1.7 
Figure 5: Optimal abatement policies for three values of the variance rate σ2,a tt w od i ﬀerent mean
ﬂow rates.



























γ  = 80 
γ  = 240 
Expected flow rate     µ = 1.0
Figure 6: Optimal abatement policies as a function of marginal abatement cost γ.






















α  = 0.02 
α  = 0.001 
Expected flow rate      µ = 1.5
Figure 7: Optimal abatement policies as a function of the discount rate α.






























2 = 1 
σ
2 = 100 






























µ = 1.0 
µ = 5.0 
1   10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90  100









Flow variability      σ 2




















Figure 8: Optimal restoration trigger as a function of the mean ﬂow rate and variability. In the
bottom panel, both ﬂow rate µ and variability σ2 are depicted along the x and y axes, with µ
ranging from 1 to 5 in increments of 0.5 and σ2 ranging over (1, 10, 20, ..., 100). Hence the four
sides of surface depicted in the ﬁgure run along the sides of the enclosing “box.” The top two panels
show the two-dimensional projections of the same surface.

















































No expectation equilibrium exists 
Expectation equilibrium
            exists     
Figure 9: Fraction of optimal cleanup due to abatement, as a function of the mean ﬂow rate µ.

















































No expectation equilibrium exists 
Expectation equilibrium 
exists 
Figure 10: Fraction of optimal cleanup due to abatement, as a function of the marginal cost
parameter γ. The expected ﬂow rate µ is equal to 1.0.
































Low flow  
µ = 1.0 
Moderate flow
µ = 1.5     High flow  
 µ = 3.0 
Figure 11: Frequency distributions of resource qualities (states) under optimal policies for three
ﬂow rates.











































  x 1/10 (lower peak)
Boyle & Bishop
  x 1/10 (lower peak)
85 205
189 149
Figure 12: Simulated optimal abatement paths for the management of the California condor. The
solid curves correspond to the two estimates based on the study by Boyle and Bishop; the broken
curves correspond to the Stevens et al. study. Restoration triggers are shown for each path.










































Figure 13: Simulated optimal abatement paths for four parameter draws. The darkest curve
represents the mean policy, as described in the text.
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